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After decades of narrowing, the achievement gap between black and white school children widened
in the 1990s – a period when the labor market rewards for education were increasing. This presents
an important puzzle for economists. In this chapter, I investigate the extent to which economic models
of segregation, information-based discrimination, peer dynamics, and identity can explain this puzzle.
Under a reasonable set of assumptions, models of peer dynamics and identity are consistent with the
time-series data. Segregation and models of discrimination both contradict the trends in important
ways.
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rfryer@fas.harvard.edu1 Trends in the Racial Achievement Gap
The racial achievement gap in education is a sobering reality. At nine months old, there
are no detectable cognitive dierences between black and white babies (Fryer and Levitt,
forthcoming). Dierences emerge as early as age two, and by the time black children enter
kindergarten they are lagging whites by 0.64 standard deviations in math and 0.40 in reading
(Fryer and Levitt, 2004). On every subject at every grade level, there are large and important
achievement dierences between blacks and whites that continue to grow as children progress
through school (Campbell, Hombo, and Mazzeo, 2000; Neal, 2006). Even accounting for a
host of background factors, the achievement gap remains large and statistically signicant
(Jencks and Phillips, 1998).
Figure 1: Black-White Achievement Gaps in NAEP
The above facts about the achievement gap are relatively well-known. More surprising
is the evidence presented in Neal (1999) that illustrates that after decades of narrowing,
achievement gaps between blacks and whites widened in the 1990s, precisely during a time
when the premium on education had increased. Figure 1, using data from nine and thirteen
2year olds born between 1958 and 1995 in the National Association of Education Progress
(NAEP), shows that cohorts born between the 1970s and 1980s experienced a consistent
decrease in the black-white gap when they took the NAEP at age nine, and a generally
decreasing trend in the gap for the NAEP administered at age thirteen. For those born
after 1980, however, the trend reverses and the black-white achievement gap widens during
a period when the premium on skills had increased. In the most recent years of the time-
series, achievement gaps seem to be converging again.
Understanding the slow down in the convergence of racial achievement gaps is an im-
portant open question.1 The answer may provide signicant clues for our understanding of
racial inequality writ large (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Neal, 1999; Fryer, forthcoming).
In this chapter, we investigate the extent to which economic models of segregation,
information-based discrimination, peer dynamics, and identity can explain the striking trends
in the achievement gap. For pedagogical purposes, we provide important details of these
classes of models and a more speculative discussion that suggests models of peer dynamics
or identity have the potential to explain trends in the racial achievement gap.
2 Segregation
Ethnic and racial segregation is an important and well-studied social phenomenon. For over
50 years, social scientists have been concerned with measuring the extent of, and estimating
the impact of, segregation in education, housing, and the labor market. The result of this
scholarship has been nearly 20 dierent indices of segregation, and a general consensus that
the spatial separation of many minorities from jobs, role models, health care, and quality
local public goods is a leading cause of racial and ethnic dierences on many economic,
social, and health related outcomes (Almond, Chay, and Greenstone, 2003; Borjas, 1995;
Case and Katz, 1991; Kain, 1968; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Massey and Denton, 1993;
Collins and Williams, 1999). To the extent that segregation plays a signicant role in for
skill development, it may partially explain the puzzle put forth in the introduction.
From 30,000 feet, segregation is the degree to which two or more groups are separated
from each other. Massey and Denton (1988) group existing indices into ve classes: even-
ness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering, which they take to resemble
the totality of what is usually meant by \segregation." Evenness refers to the dierential
distribution of two groups across areas in a city. Measures of exposure are designed to ap-
proximate the amount of potential contact and interaction between members of dierent
groups. Concentration indices measure the relative amount of physical space occupied by
1Neal (1999) investigates a similar question using dierent economic models.
3a minority group. Centralization is the extent to which a group is located near the center
of an urban area, and clustering measures the degree to which geographic units inhabited
by minority members abut one another, or cluster spatially. Below, we provide a formal
denition of an index in each of these ve classes.
The most popular measure of segregation is the \dissimilarity" index (developed by Jahn,
Schmid, and Schrag (1947)), a measure of evenness.2 Suppose a city is divided into N
sections. The dissimilarity index measures the percentage of a group's population that
would have to change sections for each section to have the same percentage of that group as
the whole city. In symbols:











   ; (1)
where blacki is the number of blacks in area i; blacktotal is the total number of blacks in the
city as a whole, nonblacki is the number of non-blacks in area i; and nonblacktotal is the
number of non-blacks in the city. The dissimilarity index has the appealing feature that it
is invariant to the size of a minority group.
A second commonly-used measure of segregation is \isolation," a measure of exposure.
As Blau (1977) recognized, blacks can be evenly distributed among residential areas in a
city, but experience little exposure to non-blacks if they are a relatively large proportion
of the city. Isolation measures the extent to which blacks are exposed only to one other,
rather than to non-blacks. The index is computed as the minority-weighted average of each
section's minority population:











where personi refers to the total population of area i.3
A third measure of segregation is the \Delta" index { a measure of concentration { orig-
inally proposed by Hoover (1941). The index is similar to the dissimilarity index. Suppose
that two cities have the same minority proportion and an equivalent degree of evenness, but
in one city minority areas are few in number and small in area, while in the other city they
2Other measures of evenness include the Gini coecient (the mean absolute dierence between minority
proportions weighted across all pairs of geographic units, expressed as a proportion of the maximum weighted
mean dierence), the Atkinson index (similar to Gini coecient, but allows researchers to decide how to
weight geographic units which are over or under the city-wide distribution) (Atkinson, 1970), and Entropy
(the weighted average of each geographic units deviation from the racial entropy of the city as a whole).
3Another commonly used measure of exposure is the interaction index, which is the inverse of the isolation
index presented above.
4are large and numerous. The former city is likely to be considered more segregated than the
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A fourth measure of segregation is the index of absolute clustering in urban spaces { the
extent to which census regions inhabited by minorities abut one another. In symbols:


































where cij refers to an element in a \contiguity matrix" that equals one when census units i and
j are contiguous and zero if not. The nal measure is an index of centralization { developed
by Massey and Denton (1988). The simplest and most widely reported centralization measure
is:







where the N areas are ordered 1 to N by increasing distance from the center city and Ai
refers to the cumulative proportion of land area through unit i. This index, which can be
applied to any racial group, provides an absolute measure of how residents of a particular
demographic live in relation to the center city.
Figure 2: A Hypothetical City
Of the ve dimensions of segregation, only two are used in the vast majority of applied
work in the social sciences: evenness and exposure. Yet, these indices have at least two
undesirable properties. First, they explicitly depend on the arbitrary ways in which cities
5can be partitioned into sections (e.g. census tracts).4 That is, xing the location of minorities
and non-minorities in a city and re-drawing the sections can drastically change the measure of
segregation. An exaggerated example is depicted in gure 2. The city depicted in the gure
has a dissimilarity index of 0 { perfect integration { when sections are drawn vertically and
has a dissimilarity index of 1 { extreme segregation { when sections are drawn horizontally;
no household has moved. Similarly, vertical partitions yield an isolation index of .5 whereas
horizontal partitions produce an index of 1. This is a highly undesirable property of any
segregation index, as it may articially indicate that a city is more or less segregated as a
function of how the tracts are drawn. An important drawback is that there is no theory of
how the city should be partitioned.
Second, existing measures are not dened when trying to measure segregation at the
level of individuals. It is dicult to correctly identify the relationship between segregation
and outcomes without individual-level variation in segregation. As a descriptive matter,
individual segregation may be more useful than city-wide segregation. Rather than corre-
late individual economic outcomes with city-wide segregation, one can correlate individual
outcomes with individual measures of segregation.5
A recent paper develops a measure of segregation based on social interactions that builds
on some of the weaknesses of dissimilarity and isolation, while incorporating elements of
traditional measures of concentration and clustering (Echenique and Fryer, 2007). To fully
understand the measure, we need a bit of a model.
Basic Building Blocks
The basic building blocks are a nite set of individuals, V; and information on whether
(and, possibly, how much) any two individuals interact. The measure, coined the spectral
segregation index, depends on the network of social interactions among the individuals in
V . Like measures of exposure, the Spectral index identies segregation of the members of a
group with the intensity of the social interactions among the members of that group.
Given any two individuals, suppose we know whether they interact with each other and
the intensity of their interaction. For any two individuals v and v0 in V , let the number
rvv0  0 represent the fraction of their social interactions v and v
0 spend together. If rvv0 = 0,
then there are no interactions between v and v0; if rvv0 > 0 then v and v0 have a relationship.
Abusing notation, let V to refer to the number of elements in the set V . The information
4We are not the rst to draw attention to this aw in measures of segregation, see Cowgill and Cowgill
(1951), Appendix A in Taeuber and Taeuber (1965), and Massey and Denton (1988). While this property
is problematic for measures of residential segregation, it is less likely to eect measures of occupational or
school segregation { where there is a natural clustering of individuals.
5This critique is conceptual { not purely data driven. Existing measures are not equipped to measure
segregation at the level of individuals, irrespective of the available data.




Now, suppose that we know the race of each individual v 2 V . Fix a race, called race h,
and drop from the set V all individuals from races other than h. Form the matrix B from
the matrix R by retaining only those rvv0 for which both v and v0 belong to race h. The
matrix B (a submatrix of R) reects the network of same-race social interactions among the
members of race h.
A segregation index for race h is a function that assigns a real number Sh(B) to each
matrix B of same-race interactions, along with functions assigning a real number sh
v(B) for
each individual member v of race h, such that Sh(B) is the average of the individual sh
v(B).
Individual segregation is measured in the same units as racial segregation; race-h segregation
is simply the average of the individual sh
v(B):
Three Properties Which Dene The Spectral Segregation Index
The rst property requires that an increase in the intensity of same-race interactions imply
an increase in segregation. Concretely, say that a matrix B0 has more intense interactions
than matrix B if all the entries of the matrix B0 are at least as large as those of B. Then,
if B = (rvv0) and B0 = (r0
vv0) we have rvv0  r0
vv0 for all v and v0. A segregation index
satises the property of monotonicity if, whenever B0 has more intense interactions than B,
Sh(B)  Sh(B0).
The second property is a normalization of the index. Let d > 0 be a real number. A
matrix B is homogeneous of degree d if, for all v in race h,
P
v0 rvv0 = d. An example of a










A segregation index is homogeneous if, whenever B is homogeneous of degree d, Sh(B) = d.
Homogeneous networks rarely occur in practice, but the property gives an interpretation
to the segregation of networks one encounters in applications. For example, a measure of 0:8
can be read as the segregation race-h individuals would have if they spent 80 percent of their
time with individuals of the same race. Homogeneity also provides a \scale free" property:
If City A has more households than City B, but each household in both cities has the same
fraction of same-race neighbors, the index will report the same level of segregation for both
cities.
Let Nv be the set of individuals of race h that v interacts with: the set of v0 in race
7h with rvv0 > 0. In a similar vein, consider the set of individuals who interacts with the
members of Nv, and those that interact with those that interact with the members of Nv,
and so on. The resulting set of individuals, with direct or indirect interactions with v, is
called the connected component of B that v belongs to; denote this set of individuals by Cv.
The third property requires that sh
v(B) be the average of sh
v0(B) among v's race-h social
interactions, relative to the average segregation of the individuals in v's connected compo-












The spectral segregation index (SSI) is the (unique) segregation index that satises the
properties of monotonicity, homogeneity, and linearity (Theorem 1, Echenique and Fryer,
2007).
On a connected component, SSI is the largest eigenvalue of the corresponding irreducible
submatrix of B. The individual SSI are obtained by distributing the component's SSI among
individuals using the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue. Thus, SSI results
from familiar matrix operations and is easy to compute using standard software.
2.1 The Impact of Segregation on Achievement
There is an impressive literature on the eects of segregation across schools on achievement.
Jonathan Guryan (2004) estimates that half of the decline in black dropout rates between
1970 and 1980 is attributable to desegregation plans. Robert Crain and Jack Strauss (1985)
nd that students randomly oered the chance to be bussed to a suburban school were
more likely to work in professional jobs nearly 20 years after the experiment. Christopher
Jencks (1972) estimates that desegregation raises black achievement by 2-3 percent. Card
and Rothstein (2007) show that roughly one-quarter of the racial gap in Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) scores can be eliminated by shifting students from a highly segregated city to
an integrated city. Based on a meta-analysis of ninety-three studies, Robert Crain and Rita
Mahard (1981) conclude that desegregation has a signicant eect on black achievement,
especially younger children, though other meta-analyses are less conclusive (St. John, 1975).
Whether or not segregation can explain the stagnation in the convergence of black and
white test scores is an open question for which we do not have solid evidence. There are at
least three potential scenarios: (1) the quantity of residential segregation increased during
the late 1980s and early 1990s which corresponds with the widening of the achievement gap;
(2) residential segregation has remained constant but segregation in social contacts within
8schools have increased; or (3) the price of segregation increased during the relevant years.
Figure 3: Indices of Racial Segregation, 1980-2000
Figure 3 provides trends in segregation for the ve measures described above: dissimi-
larity, isolation, delta, absolute centralization, and absolute clustering. All these measures
follow a similar downward trend; America is becoming less racially segregated. Thus, the
data from gure 3 lead one to conclude that the quantity of segregation did not increase in
the relevant years.
Within-school segregation, commonly referred to as \second-generation segregation," is
thought to be as important as segregation across schools in inhibiting the educational oppor-
tunities of racial and ethnic minorities (Mickelson, 2001). Arguing against this hypothesis
is evidence from Echenique, Fryer, and Kaufman (2006). They show, using the Spectral
index to measure racial segregation of the school social networks of middle and high school
students in the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health, that whether or not
students are socially connected within schools has a substantively unimportant relationship
with academic achievement.
The nal explanation of how segregation can explain the trends in the achievement gap
is more dicult to assess because of a lack of data on the eective price of segregation. It is
9plausible that schools in urban centers deteriorated relative to those in the suburbs during
this time, and thus, the price of segregation increased. However, we cannot nd any time
series data that can serve as a reasonable proxy for school quality. Because of this, we are
unable to make rm conclusions about the importance of segregation in explaining trends in
the achievement gap. We know that the level of segregation has not changed substantially,
but the consequences of that segregation may have become greater over time.
3 Information-Based Models of Discrimination
A second potential explanation for our set of time-series facts is that information-based
discrimination (statistical or categorical in nature) leads to equilibria in which the net benet
of investment for those that are discriminated against is lower than for those who do not face
discrimination, and this became more salient in the late 1980s and 1990s. To understand the
explanatory power of these models, we outline the conceptual apparatus and main results in
Coate and Loury (1993) and Fryer and Jackson (2008).
Coate and Loury (1993) build on the models of Arrow (1973) and Lundberg and Startz
(1983) to develop a statistical discrimination model in which discrimination manifests itself
in job assignments (such as Milgrom and Oster (1987)) rather than wages and includes an
investment in human capital.
Statistical Discrimination - The Basic Building Blocks
Let there be a continuum of agents referred to as workers and a set of agents referred
to as employers. Nature moves rst and assigns a type to each worker. This type, denoted
c, indicates each worker's cost of investing, where c 2 [c;c]; such that 0 < c < c < 1,
with cumulative distribution function G(): After observing their cost, workers makes an
investment decision q 2 f0;1g, where q = 1 if the worker choose to become qualied and




regarding the worker's investment
decision. Let Fq() denote the smooth and continuous cumulative distribution function of 
for a qualied worker and Fu() is the cumulative distribution function of  for unqualied
workers, with related densities fq() and fu() respectively. Per usual, assume that these
densities are strictly positive, continuous, bounded, and the ratio
fu()
fq() is decreasing in 
(monotone likelihood ratio property).
Next, the employer observes  and makes a hiring decision h 2 f0;1g where h = 1 if the
employer decides to hire the worker and h = 0 if not.
Payos
10If the worker is hired, he receives a xed payo of !   c if he chose to invest and ! if
not, where ! > 0: The employer's net payo for hiring a worker is q > 0 if the worker is
qualied and  u < 0 if the worker is unqualied. The payo to the employer for rejecting
a worker is normalized to zero.
Strategies
A strategy for the worker species for each type whether he will invest. Namely, I :
[c;c] ! f0;1g where I is known as the worker's investment function. A strategy for the




! [0;1], where A is known as the
employer's function. Without loss of generality, the employer's strategy can be represented




; such that the employer hires the worker if   s:
Expected Payos
Let  denote the employer's prior probability that the worker is qualied. Expected
payos for the employer are functions of her prior probability and the test score she observes.
Given  and observed , she formulates a posterior probability 	(;) that the worker is
qualied. Using Bayes' rule, 	(;) 
fq()
fq() + (1   )fu()
:The expected payo for hiring
a worker is then 	(;)q   [1   	(;)]u
Conversely, the worker's expected payo is a function of the threshold set by the employer
and his cost. Expecting standard s, the worker's expected payo is [1   Fq(s)]!   c if he
invests and [1   Fu(s)]! if he does not invest.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a pair of functions (I;A) such that each is a best response to the
other. In any equilibrium, workers invest if and only if their cost is less than the net benet:
c  [Fu(s)   Fq (s)]!   (s): The fraction of workers who invest in equilibrium is G( (s)):














. An employers initial beliefs  are self-conrming in that  =
G( (s)):
Coate and Loury (1993) show that multiple equilibria can exist. Figure 4 demonstrates
the basic intuition. There are two stable equilibria. One equilibrium contains optimistic
beliefs and relatively low standards, which induces workers to invest and conrms the em-
ployer's optimistic beliefs. A second equilibrium consists of relatively pessimistic beliefs
which induce lower levels of investment from workers and this too conrms the employer's
pessimistic views.
Categorical Decision Making - Basic Building Blocks
11Let C = fC1;:::;Cng denote a nite set of categories, O represent a nite set of objects
that are to be sorted, m be the number of attributes possessed by an object, and  : O !
f0;1g
m denote the function, written as (1(o);:::;m(o)), which describes the attributes
that each object has.
Figure 4: Coate and Loury Multiple Equilibrium
Once an object is encountered, then it is stored in memory by assigning it to a category.
Let f : O ! C denote the function that keeps track of the assignment of each object to a
category, where f(o) = Ci means that object o has been assigned to category Ci.
Given some set of objects that have been categorized, O; and a categorization f, the
decision-maker will nd it useful to capture the essence of a category through a prototype.






The mean of a category Ci under a categorization f is then simply

f
(Ci) = (fo : f(o) = Cig): (6)
Now let us suppose that the decision maker faces an object and must choose an action a
12from a set of actions A. The expected utility of taking action a when faced with object o is
EU(a;o) = U(a;(f(o)): (7)
That is, the decision maker calls upon past experiences as a guide for predicting future
payos in a boundedly rational manner. The decision maker views an object only through
the prototype of the category that the object is identied with.
Let us begin with an initial set of objects that our decision maker has interacted with
in the past, O. The decision maker has categorized these according to some f. In some
situations it will be useful for us to think about an \optimal" method of categorization.
There are many possible ways to do this, and we pick an obvious one. We dene an optimal
categorization as categorizing past objects in a way to minimize the total sum (across objects)
of within-category variance. In order to do this, we need to be explicit about how variation
is measured.
Let d be some measure of the distance between two vectors of attributes and let the









The total sum of within category variance under a categorization f is then simply summing




V ar(fo : f(o) 2 Cig): (9)
An optimal categorization function relative to O is a categorization f that minimizes
V ar(f;O).6
Using the above framework, Fryer and Jackson (2008) present a series of results that
partially characterize optimal categorizations; a general characterization is NP-hard. Taken
together, their results suggest the following simple heuristic. Start by assigning groups
to dierent categories until one is faced with more heterogeneous groups than categories.
Then, group together the two that produce the smallest variation based on the groups
currently faced, and continue in this manner until all objects are sorted. With small costs
of reoptimization, a decision maker might continue down a myopic path of categorization
with periodic reoptimizations. At a basic level, this heuristic algorithm for categorically
6There may be multiple solutions to this problem, but there is always at least one for any nite set of
objects.
13processing information has deep intuition. Objects that are encountered less frequently
(minority groups, e.g.) are sorted more coarsely in a decision maker's brain and less informed
and nuanced decisions can be made regarding this set of objects.
3.1 The Impact of Information-Based Discrimination on Skill Ac-
quisition
Models of statistical discrimination and categorization can potentially explain the achieve-
ment gap in levels. If 
b < 
w; as in Figure 4, blacks invest less in skills and there is a
resulting achievement gap. Similarly, if blacks are more coarsely categorized due to their
small numbers in the population or segregation, their skills will not be equally rewarded and
this too will lead to a skill gap.
To be consistent with the time series, one needs an exogenous shock in the late 1980s to
a parameter in the model such as the beliefs, information technology, or frequency of social
interactions. We have no good evidence either way on the plausibility of this assumption.
The theory seems to fall short, however, in explaining why blacks' investment decreases
at precisely the time the return on investment was increasing. Both information-based
discrimination models predict that blacks have a lower return on investment than whites.
The empirical evidence, however, seems to point in the opposite direction. Table 1 presents
the return to the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) which is available in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and 1997. In both datasets, the return on investment in
AFQT is as high, or higher, for blacks relative to whites (see also Neal and Johnson, 1996).
Table 1:
Racial Dierences in the Return to AFQT
NLSY79 NLSY97







Age 0.009 {0.013 0.070 {0.023 0.051 0.059 0.045 0.037 0.023
(0.016) (0.023) (0.028) (0.036) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.053)
AFQT 0.273 0.257 0.286 0.313 0.099 0.108 0.152 0.094 0.083
(0.019) (0.026) (0.039) (0.031) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.117)
AFQT2 0.034 0.040 0.021 0.062 {0.016 {0.021 {0.032 0.004 0.082
(0.017) (0.023) (0.035) (0.028) (0.010) (0.012) (0.020) (0.022) (0.106)
Black x AFQT 0.013 0.050
(0.044) (0.020)
Black x AFQT2 {0.003 0.002
(0.039) (0.020)
Obs. 2211 1134 652 425 6482 3419 1598 1410 55
R2 0.165 0.137 0.128 0.162 0.068 0.053 0.078 0.032 0.049
144 Peer Dynamics
Our third class of models is a formal representation of a peculiar peer externality referred
to as peer pressure or, more casually, `acting white.' Economists and sociologists have
argued that dierences in academic achievement are the result of negative peer interactions
or spillovers which are manifested in a particularly insidious form: black peers/communities
impose costs on their members who try to `act white' (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Fordham,
1996; Corwin, 2001; Suskind, 1998).7 Individuals exposed to these social interactions have
disincentives to invest in particular behaviors (i.e. education or proper speech) due to the
fact that they may be rejected by their social peer group.
In what follows, we present a simple model of peer pressure based on insights from Austen-
Smith and Fryer (2005) and Fryer (2007). The key idea is that an individual's educational
investment is a signal, both to potential employers about the individual's productivity and
to peers about the individual's social compatibility. Employers are free to adjust wages
continuously in an individual's signaled productivity; the peer group simply makes a binary
decision regarding whether the individual is deemed acceptable or not. So, although it is
assumed that employers have no direct interest in the individual's social status and that peers
have no direct interests in the individual's productivity, the equilibrium consequence of two-
audience signaling with a common decision is that a subset of productive types underinvest
in education relative to the situation without any peers to impress. The following model
captures this intuition.
The Basic Building Blocks
Let there be a continuum of individuals with unit mass, a nite set of rms, and a
(suitably anthropomorphized) peer group. There are two discrete stages of an individual's
life: \school years" and \employment years," denoted  2 f0;1g. Nature moves rst and
distributes an innate ability, , to each student according to a smooth common knowledge
cumulative distribution function (CDF) F. Abilities, once disseminated, are xed. An
individual is endowed with one unit of non-storable time in each period, the allocation of
which is common knowledge.
At the start of each period, an individual's stage  time allocation problem is inuenced
by whether or not she is an accepted member of her peer group. Peer groups are valued
because, other things equal, leisure time spent in the group is more enjoyable than leisure
time spent outside the group. If an individual is not an accepted member, then she makes
decisions without reference to the group. If she is an accepted group member, then she
may be called upon to make some observable time contribution to the group. That is, in
7There is no consensus on this view, however. A discussion follows in section 4.1.
15each stage , Nature chooses a required time contribution  2 [0;  );0 <   < 1, from
the individual to the group, according to a smooth common knowledge CDF G(). We
assume the school year contribution is expected to be no greater than the post-school year
contribution.
In the \school years," individuals allocate eort among leisure, group commitments, and a
once-and-for-all investment in education, s 2 [0;1]. The cost of investing s for an individual
with ability  is denoted c(s;).8 The cost function is assumed to be strictly increasing
and convex in education, to be strictly decreasing in innate ability and to satisfy the single-
crossing property. To ensure that all ability types choose interior education levels, we further
assume that lims!0 cs(s;) = 0 and lims!1 cs(s;) = 1.
At the end of the school years, an individual's education level is xed and rms choose
wage oers to maximize expected prot. Because rms do not observe an individual's innate
ability, the wage oered to any potential employee is that individual's expected marginal
product conditional on her observed schooling. For simplicity, assume that individuals are
paid a wage equal to their expected marginal product, !(s)  0, and (where appropriate)
specify the rms' responses to any out of equilibrium action by an individual.
Let  2 0;1 denote whether the individual is rejected ( = 0) or accepted ( = 1)
by his or her peer group in . If an individual is rejected by the group during the school
years, she cannot be accepted in the post-school years; however, an individual accepted by
the group in the school years may be rejected in the post-school years.9 Let u(lj) be the
individual's stage  payo from leisure l 2 [0;1], conditional on the group's decision. If an
individual is an accepted group member in some  and is asked to make a contribution , let
 2 f0;1g denote an individual's decision on whether or not to comply (respectively,  = 1
or  = 0). Thus, an individual's stage 0 payo from choosing 0, given the individual's
innate ability, school year education decision, and required contribution 0 can be written
as: u(1 s 000j0) c(s;). Assume u(lj) is twice dierentiable concave, increasing in
l over the range (0;1), and no leisure is worthless irrespective of group acceptance. Further,
we assume that both total and marginal values from consuming any strictly positive amount
of leisure are greater as an accepted group member than otherwise.
At the beginning of the employment years, the group makes another acceptance decision,
and Nature reveals an individual's post-school years time commitment to the group, 1.
Then, each individual decides whether or not to contribute to the group, and makes work-
force eort decision e 2 [0;1]. Any student who is accepted by the group and contributes
in the post-school years receives a lifetime utility benet .10 The employment years payo
8This is in addition to the direct opportunity cost of eort used for education in the school years.
9This is without any loss of generality (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2003).
10In the innite horizon version of the model (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2003), the value  is explicitly
16can be written as: u(1   e   111j1) + e!(s) + 11, where  2 (0;1) is a standard
discount factor.
Suppose an individual is accepted by his peers in the school years. At the beginning of
the employment years, the group decides whether to accept or reject the individual. Then,
Nature randomly chooses the group contribution, 1, required of each individual and they
decide whether to make the contribution. The realization and the individual's decision are
observed by the group. Let  (;) be the stage  payo to the group from action ,
given the individual makes decision  when the required contribution is , where for all
  0,  (1;) >  (0;). The key feature of the group's payos is that the group is strictly
worse o having accepted an individual who chooses not to make her required contribution
than it would be were such an individual rejected.
Figure 5: Non-Existence of Fully Separating Equilibria
Solving the preceding model yields three results. First, no equilibria exist in which all
types adopt distinct education choices; all equilibria must involve some pooling. This result
derived as an equilibrium payo to a repeated interaction game between the individual and the group. As
such, it depends on school years decisions, among others. In the two-period model, it is enough for there to
be some reason for the individual to contribute in the post-school years if required to do so.
17is illustrated in Figure 5, which depicts the net utility accruing to a type ^  individual. As
shown in the gure, at any given educational investment level, s, the individual's net payo
is strictly greater being accepted than being rejected by the group, and further, in each case
the net payo is strictly quasi-concave in educational eort with an interior maximum.
Second and most interesting, after application of a standard belief-based equilibrium
renement (the D1 criterion), all equilibria involve a partition of individual abilities into at
most three intervals, which is depicted in Figure 6. A (possibly empty) set of the lowest
ability types ( < 1) and the set of highest ability types ( > 
) reveal themselves through
a separating education strategy; ability types in the middle interval ( 2 [1;
]) pool on a
common education level. Only types in the lower intervals are accepted by the group. It
is worth emphasizing that nothing is built into the model that requires accepted types to
adopt a common educational investment; it is an equilibrium outcome.
The two-audience signaling model has two clear predictions: racial dierences in the rela-
tionship between group acceptance and academic achievement will exist and these dierences
will tend to be exacerbated in environments with more interracial contact and increased mo-
bility. Thus, contrary to models of information-based discrimination, one might expect less
investment in these models of peer dynamics when there is a wage premium. The next step
is to get a sense of the potential magnitudes of these theoretical predictions.
Figure 6: D1 Equilibria in the Two-Audience Signaling Model
184.1 The Potential Impact of `Acting White' on Achievement
There is a small literature on the existence of `acting white' that includes both qualitative
and quantitative analysis in sociology, economics, and policy studies. Two of the most
important papers in this literature are Fordham and Ogbu (1986) and Fordham (1996), which
argue for the prevalence of an oppositional culture among black youth that eschew behaviors
traditionally seen as the prerogative for whites. Their hypothesis states that the observed
disparity between blacks and whites stems from the following factors: (1) white people
provide them with inferior schooling and treat them dierently in school; (2) by imposing
a job ceiling, white people fail to reward them adequately for their academic achievement
in adult life; and (3) black Americans develop coping devices which, in turn, further limit
their striving for academic success.11 In other words, a major reason that black students do
not do well in school is that they experience inordinate ambivalence and aective dissonance
in regard to academic eort and success.12 This dilemma between racial authenticity and
achievement has been documented in many ethnographies and the popular media.13
There is an apparent conict between the ethnographic evidence on `acting white' and
two nationally representative studies that seemingly nd no justication for the oppositional
culture hypothesis { attempting to dismiss `acting white' as nothing more than an urban
legend (Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998; Cook and Ludwig, 1998). Cook and Ludwig
(1998) ask three questions: (1) Do African-American adolescents report greater alienation
from school than non-Hispanic whites? (2) Does academic success lead to social ostracism
among black adolescents? (3) Do the social costs or benets of academic success dier
by race? For each question, their answer based on analysis of the National Educational
Longitudinal Survey (NELS) { a nationally representative sample of 24,599 students who
were in eighth grade in 1988 { is \apparently not."
11Fordham and Ogbu (1986) suggest the problem arose partly because white Americans traditionally
refused to acknowledge that black Americans were capable of intellectual achievement, and partly because
black Americans subsequently began to doubt their own intellectual ability, began to dene academic success
as white people's prerogative, and began to discourage their peers, perhaps unconsciously, from emulating
white people in striving for academic success.
12Generally, there are large literatures concerning group inuences on individual decision-making in so-
ciology and social psychology, yet eorts to develop more formal models addressing how such inuences
aect economic decisions in general, let alone with regard to education and investment in human capital, are
relatively new. And within the formal literature, most of the work is devoted to understanding the economic
implications of (more or less) given social norms: recent examples include Akerlof (1976, 1980), Bernheim
(1994), Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999), and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992). While much of
this literature bears in some way on the issue here, none of it directly considers the role of peer pressure on
human capital formation.
13For recent work on the prevalence of `acting white' among blacks, see Corwin (2001), Fordham (1991),
Ogbu and Davis (2003), or Suskind (1998). One can also conduct a Lexis-Nexis search of major newspapers,
which will yield scads of articles.
19Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming) uses the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
Health (Add Health) data set, which is a nationally representative sample of 90,118 stu-
dents entering grades 7 through 12 in the 1994-1995 academic year. The key feature of the
Add Health data is the detailed information regarding friendship associations in schools. All
students contained in the in-school survey were asked, \List your closest male/female friends.
List your best male/female friend rst, then your next best friend, and so on." Students were
allowed to list as many as ve friends from either sex. Each friend can be linked in the data
and the full range of covariates in the in-school survey (race, gender, grade point average,
etc.) can be gleaned from each friend.
To circumvent some of the problems inherent in self-reported popularity measures such
as those contained in NELS, Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming) construct an index of social
status. For each student the index measures the number of same-race friends within her
school, weighted by the social status of each friend. The index is implemented using the
detailed information on friendship networks above.
Figure 7: Spectral Popularity and Grades by Race, Raw Data (Add Health)
Figure 7 presents the relationship between social status and grades among whites, blacks,
and Hispanics in the raw data. At low grade point averages, there is little dierence among
racial groups in the relationship between social status and grades; blacks are more popular
20than whites. At roughly a 2.5 GPA (an even mix of B's and C's) racial dierences start to
emerge. Hispanic students lose social status at an alarming rate after this cut-o { while
blacks and whites continue to garner friends as their grades increase; the white slope is
steeper. Black social status peaks at a grade point average of roughly 3.48 (an even mix of
A's and B's) and turns down afterward. Blacks with straight A's are as popular as blacks
with a 2.9 GPA. Whites continue to gain social status as their grades increase.
Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming) explore the sensitivity of these results to alternative
empirical specication and myriad subsamples of the data. For instance, one of the biggest
worries with the results presented thus far is that they implicitly assume that higher grades
cause lower popularity. It is certainly plausible that high popularity causes lower grades
through a simple time constraint or other mechanism. Using an instrument for popularity
{ a student's physical attractiveness { Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming) argue that the causal
arrow is in the expected direction.
The most surprising nding from this exercise is how the coecient on `acting white'
varies in arenas with more or less interracial contact. Partitioning the sample of schools
in several ways demonstrates this: high versus low segregation, schools where blacks and
whites are the simple majority and schools that are 80 percent black versus those that are
20 percent black. Remarkably, schools that are less than 20 percent black have the largest
`acting white' eect for blacks and Hispanics. In schools that are 80 percent black or greater,
the coecient on grades is large and negative and the coecient on black interacted with
grades is large, positive, and imprecisely measured. A joint signicance test conrms that one
cannot distinguish between the coecients on grades and black*grades in the full sample
and schools that are greater than 80 percent black. We can be condent, however, that
the `acting white' coecients are statistically dierent between schools that are less than 20
percent black and those that are greater than 80 percent. Similarly, blacks in more segregated
schools incur less of a tradeo between social status and achievement. The coecient on
the `acting white' term is twice as large in schools that are above the median in terms of
segregation (-0.055 compared to -0.136). Among high-achievers, the dierences are starker
(-0.144 and -0.536) [not shown in tabular form].
To supplement this analysis, we also depict racial dierences between the number of
friends a student has in a school and their classroom grades using data collected from all
middle schools in Washington, DC { the same city which Fordham and Ogbu (1986) collected
their qualitative data. We used the same questionnaire administered in Add Health to assess
the social networks of students in schools. We then linked this data to administrative les
kept by the school district which contains student grades, test scores, and so on.
21Figure 8: Popularity and Grades by Race, Raw Data (DC District)
Figure 8 is similar to gure 7, but the sample is all Washington, DC, public middle schools.
Hispanic popularity decreases monotonically with their grade point average { higher grades
are associated with lower popularity. Popularity and grades are positively correlated for
white students until a grade point average of roughly 3. That is, B students and A students
garner the same high level of popularity in school. Black popularity increases monotonically
from very low grades to straight A students. These data are consistent with the results
in Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming) { no racial dierences in the relationship between social
status and achievement in majority black schools.
How Do We Reconcile Dierences in NELS and Add Health?
There are three ways to reconcile the starkly dierent conclusions in Cook and Ludwig
(1997) and Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming). First, the NELS contains a question that asks
if the student \thinks others see him/her as popular." The answer choices are: `not at
all,' `somewhat,' or `very'; over 80 percent of the respondents categorized themselves as
`somewhat' or `very' popular. The popularity index in Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming) is a
continuous measure. Second, Cook and Ludwig (1997) also use two dichotomous achievement
measures: (1) whether the student earns \mostly A's in math"; and whether the student is
in the honor society. Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming) use a continuous measure of GPA from
220 to 4.0. A third possibility is that Add Health and NELS are just dierent data sets with
dierent sampling protocols and yield dierent conclusions.
Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming) show that using dichotomous or other measures of pop-
ularity in Add Health yields the same results, but restructuring the academic achievement
measure to be dichotomous (mostly A's, e.g.) as in Cook and Ludwig (1997) the racial
dierences between popularity and achievement in Add Health disappear. Further, using a
continuous measure of grade point average (gleaned from transcript les) in the NELS pro-
vides similar results to those in Fryer and Torelli (forthcoming). Thus, the stark dierences
in the empirical literature on `acting white' are simply due to the fact that dichotomous mea-
sures of achievement mask important dierences between racial groups in the relationship
between social status and academic achievement.
How Important is `Acting White' in Explaining Trends in the Racial Achievement Gap?
We cannot even hazard a guess. The comparative statics of the theoretical models are
consistent with the trends, but it is unclear whether the empirical work thus far even cap-
tures the important elements of the phenomenon. Thus, we echo Ferguson (1998) on the
importance of collecting new data that more accurately measures the social interactions of
students and the eort that students put into their schoolwork. To date, data sets available
to researchers do not measure the behaviors that are most indicative of peer dynamics.
5 Identity
Our nal model uses identity { a person's sense of self { in economic decision making ala
Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In their proposed utility function, identity is based on social
categories, C. Each person j has an assignment of people to these categories, Cj, so that each
person has a conception of her own categories and that of all other people. Prescriptions
P indicate the behavior appropriate for people in dierent social categories in dierent
situations. The prescriptions may also describe an ideal for each category in terms of physical
characteristics and other attributes. Categories may also have higher or lower social status.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) use the word identity to describe both a person's self-image as
well as her assigned categories.
Consider the following utility function: Uj = Uj (aj;a j;Ij). Utility depends on j's
identity or self-image, Ij; as well as on the usual vectors of j's actions, aj and the actions
of others, a j. Since aj and a j determine j's consumption of goods and services, these
arguments and Uj () are sucient to capture the standard economics of own actions and
externalities.
23Let Ij = Ij (aj;a j;cj;j;P) denote person j's identity, which depends on j's assigned
social categories cj. The social status of a category is given by the function Ij (), and
a person assigned a category with higher social status may enjoy an enhanced self-image.
Identity further depends on the extent to which j's own given characteristics, j; match the
ideal of j's assigned category, indicated by the prescriptions P. Finally, identity depends on
the extent to which j's own and others' actions correspond to prescribed behavior indicated
by P. Increases or decreases in utility that derive from Ij are gains or losses in identity. In
the simplest case, an individual j chooses actions to maximize utility Uj, taking as given cj,
j, and P and the actions of others.
5.1 Interpreting the data through the lens of an Identity Model
An identity model such as Akerlof and Kranton (2000) can potentially explain our time-series
data on the racial achievement gap if there was a shift in culture or identity prescriptions in
the late 1980s and 1990s. A primary obstacle to the study of culture and identity has been
the lack of quantitative measures. Using data that cover every child born in California over
a period of four decades (1961-2000), Fryer and Levitt (2004) document stark dierences
between black and white name choices. More than forty percent of the black girls born in
California in recent years received a name that not one of the roughly 100,000 white girls
born in California in that year was given (Fryer and Levitt, 2004). Even among popular
names, racial patterns are pronounced. Names such as DeShawn, Tyrone, Reginald, Shanice,
Precious, Kiara, and Deja are quite popular among blacks, but virtually unheard of for
whites. Connor, Cody, Jake, Molly, Emily, Abigail, and Caitlin are distinctively white
names. Each of those names appears in at least 2,000 cases, with less than two percent of
recipients black. Overall, black choices of rst names dier substantially more from whites
than do the names chosen by native born Hispanics and Asians.
Surprisingly, the time series pattern of black rst names follows a similar pattern to the
test scores in Figure 1. In the 1960s, the dierences in name choices between blacks and
whites were relatively small, and factors that predict distinctively black names in later years
(single mothers, racially isolated neighborhoods, etc.) have much lower explanatory power
in the 1960's. At that time, blacks who lived in highly racially segregated neighborhoods
adopted names that were almost indistinguishable from blacks in more integrated neighbor-
hoods. Within a seven-year period in the early 1970's, however, a profound shift in naming
conventions took place, especially among blacks in racially isolated neighborhoods. The me-
dian black female in a segregated area went from receiving a name that was twice as likely to
be given to blacks as whites to a name that was more than twenty times as likely to be given
24to blacks. Black male names moved in the same direction, but the shift was less pronounced.
Among a subset of blacks, encompassing about one-fourth of blacks overall and one-half of
those in predominantly white neighborhoods, name choices actually became more similar to
those of whites during this period.
Figure 9: Changes in Black Naming Patterns by Racial Composition of Neighborhood and
by Quartile of Black Name Index
For children born in each year between 1961 and 2000, Fryer and Levitt (2004) compute
a black name index (BNI) { the share of individuals with a given name that are black { and
then rank order the blacks in their sample according to how black each newborn's name is.
Figure 9 presents the mean BNI by year for each of the four quartiles of the distribution. The
top quartile is very close to 100 throughout the entire time period (i.e. almost one-quarter of
blacks had names virtually never given to whites throughout the sample) and thus exhibits
little time-series variation. For the other three quartiles, black naming patterns were largely
stable throughout most of the 1960s. Beginning in the late 1960s, the second quartile from
the top experiences a sharp rise in how black the name choices are. Between 1968 and 1977,
the mean BNI within this quartile goes from roughly 75 (meaning the name was three times
25as likely to be given to a black baby as a white baby) to almost 95 (15 times more likely
to be given to a black baby). The third quartile also rises over that time period, but not
as sharply, and then increases more dramatically over the period 1985-2000. The bottom
quartile, in contrast, remains almost unchanged throughout the sample period.
Whether or not the substantial increases in black naming patterns in the third quartile
between 1985 and 2000 are indicative of a large cultural shift (similar to the Black Power
Movement in the late 1960s) is unknown. The late 1990s was a period in which rap music
gained enormous popularity and Afrocentric curriculum spread through schools (Au, 2005;
Thernstrom, 1992). Indeed, some have argued that rap music is the reason for the decline
in black test scores in the late 1980s (Ferguson, 2001). The impact of hip-hop music on
the racial achievement gap is an important question for which we have very little data. Yet,
underlying forces that both popularized hip-hop and created a rise in Afrocentrism during the
late 1980s may be associated with a shock to the identity prescriptions of black adolescents.
If true, this has the potential to explain the trends. Much more testing and data are needed
before one can make rm conclusions.
6 Conclusion
One of the biggest puzzles in the analysis of racial inequality is why black and white academic
achievement diverges at a time when the price of skills is increasing. In this chapter, we have
explored the extent to which models of segregation, information-based discrimination, peer
dynamics and identity can explain this set of facts.
Segregation is an unlikely answer unless one nds evidence that suggests the price of
segregation changed drastically over the relevant time period. The level of segregation has
been decreasing in America since the 1940s (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 1999). Models
of information-based discrimination are also unlikely to explain the trends in the racial
achievement gap. This class of models has the troubling feature that the return on investment
is lower for the group who is discriminated against. Yet, data suggest the opposite.
Models of peer dynamics and identity { both relatively new to the eld of social economics
{ have the potential to explain the data. Their dierences are subtle: the identity model
depends on a shift in preferences which eschews achievement; a peer dynamic framework
predicts that achievement and social mobility will be negatively correlated. Further data
and renement of these models are needed to eventually solve this important puzzle.
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